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Abstract 
Depression has been associated with impaired neural processing of reward and 
punishment. However, to date, little is known regarding the relationship between 
depression and intertemporal choice for gain and loss. We compared impulsivity and 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice for monetary gain and loss (quantified with 
parameters in the q-exponential discount function based on Tsallis' statistics) between 
depressive patients and healthy control subjects. This examination is potentially 
important for advances in neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice, because depression 
is associated with reduced serotonergic activities in the brain. We observed that 
depressive patients were more impulsive and time-inconsistent in intertemporal choice 
action for gain and loss, in comparison to healthy controls. The usefulness of the 
q-exponential discount function for assessing the impaired decision-making by 
depressive patients was demonstrated. Furthermore, biophysical mechanisms underlying 
the altered intertemporal choice by depressive patients are discussed in relation to 
impaired serotonergic neural systems. 
 
Keywords: Depression, Discounting, Neuroeconomics, Impulsivity, Inconsistency, 
Tsallis' statistics
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Impulsivity and depression 
Depressive patients have neuropsychological impairments including deficits in 
sensitivity to reward and punishment [1] and decision-making [2]. It is also known that 
altered serotonergic neural systems are associated with depression and related 
decision-making impairments [3]. Because depressive disorders are strongly associated 
with impulsive and risky behavior such as suicide attempts [4,5], it is of importance to 
establish a rigorous behavioral framework for assessing the degrees of impairments in 
decision-making by depressive subjects. In this study, we examined two distinct 
neuropsychological tendencies; i.e., impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal 
choice (delay discounting) by clinically diagnosed depressive patients. Briefly, 
impulsivity in intertemporal choice refers to the degree of preference for (or aversion to) 
smaller sooner rewards (punishments) over later larger ones; while inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice refers to time-dependency of the impulsivity in intertemporal 
choice (we will illustrate these two tendencies in the next section). Because previous 
studies indicate that serotonergic functioning in the brain (known to be reduced in 
depressed patients) may be related to the evaluation of future rewards [6], these 
investigations are of potential importance for neuroeconomic understandings of 
depression and biophysical mechanisms of serotonergic systems underlying impaired 
decision-making by mood disorder patients. However, to date, little is known about the 
relationships between depression, impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice, 
partly due to a difficulty in operationalizing impulsivity and inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice in a distinct manner. 
Recent studies in econophysics and neuroeconomics have demonstrated the 
usefulness of the q-exponential discount function [7-9] to parametrize both impulsivity 
and inconsistency in intertemporal choice. We therefore compared both impulsivity and 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice for monetary gains and losses between depressive 
patients and healthy control subjects, by utilizing the q-exponential discount function. It 
is further to be noted that this study is the first to compare both impulsivity and 
time-inconsistency in intertemporal choice between control and neuropsychiatric patient 
groups by utilizing the q-exponential discount function based on Tsallis' statistics. 
 
1.2 Impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice 
Impulsivity in intertemporal choice (delay discounting) for gain refers to preference for 
smaller but more immediate rewards over larger but more delayed ones. Consider the 
following example: 
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(A) Choose between (A.1) One cup of coffee now. 
                 (A.2) Two cups of coffee tomorrow. 
(B) Choose between (B.1) One cup of coffee in one year. 
                 (B.2) Two cups of coffee in [one year plus one day]. 
 
Most people may prefer a sooner smaller reward in (A) (i.e., (A.1), impulsive choice); 
while prefer a later larger reward in (B) (i.e., (B.2), patient choice). These examples 
demonstrate that most people are patient in making a plan about intertemporal choice in 
the distant future, but impulsive in the near future, resulting in "preference reversal" as 
time passes [10-12]. It is to be noted that consistent decision-makers should choose 
either [(A1) and (B1)] or [(A2) and (B2)] because time-intervals between sooner smaller 
rewards and later larger ones are the same (i.e., one day) in both (A) and (B). In 
summary, impulsivity in delay discounting of gain corresponds to the degree to which 
the subject discount the delayed reward; while inconsistency in delay discounting 
corresponds to the dependency of the intensity of aversion to waiting for one day to 
obtain an additional cup of coffee, on time-points (now or 1 year later) in the examples 
above. It is also to be noted that example A is about the actual intertemporal choice 
action; on the other hand, example B is about the intertemporal choice plan. Note that 
people cannot actually take future actions now, and therefore choosing (B2) is a future 
plan (not an actual action); while choosing (A1) is an actual action. Neuroeconomic 
studies have reported that addiction to drugs of abuse is associated with impulsive 
intertemporal choice for gain (e.g. choosing immediate rewards from drug intake at the 
cost of later larger rewards such as healthy body in later life) [13-16]; while little is 
known about the relationships between neuropsychiatric illnesses including addiction 
and inconsistency in intertemporal choice.  
In intertemporal choice for loss, discounting of delayed loss corresponds to a 
decrease in aversion to loss when the loss is delayed. In other words, subjects who avoid 
paying small costs immediately and choose to pay larger later costs are strong delay 
discounters of loss. Therefore, strong delay discounting of loss (impulsivity in delay 
discounting of loss) represents the marked tendency of procrastination about paying a 
cost. 
 
1.3 q-exponential discount function based on Tsallis' statistics 
Recent econophysical and neuroeconomic studies [7-9] proposed and examined 
the following q-exponential discount function based on Tsallis' statistics: 
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V(D)=A/ expq(kqD)=A/[1+(1-q)kqD]
1/(1-q)
         (Equation 1) 
 
where expq () is the q-exponential function, D is a delay until receipt of a reward, A is 
the value of a reward at D=0, and kq is a parameter of impulsivity at delay D=0. Note 
that when q=0, equation 1 is the same as a simple hyperbolic discount function [10-12]: 
 V(D)=A/(1+khD),                                        (Equation 2),  
where kh=k0, while q→1, is the same as an exponential discount function proposed in 
classical economics [17]: 
V(D)=Aexp(-keD),                                       (Equation 3) 
where ke=k1. 
In any continuous time-discounting functions, a discount rate is defined as 
-(dV(D)/dD)/V(D), independently of functional types of discount models, and larger 
discount rates corresponds to more impulsive intertemporal choice. In the q-exponential 
discount function, the discount rate (q-exponential discount rate) is: 
 
-V’(D)/V(D)=kq/(1+kq(1-q)D).          (Equation 4) 
 
We can see that when q=1, the discount rate is independent of delay D, corresponding to 
exponential discounting (consistent intertemporal choice); while for q<1, the discount 
rate is a decreasing function of delay D, resulting in preference reversal. This can also 
be demonstrated by calculating the time-derivative of the q-exponential discount rate: 
 
(d /dD) [-V’(D)/V(D)]= kq
2
(1-q)/(kq(1-q)D+1)
2 
     (Equation 5) 
 
which is negative and positive for q<1 and q>1, respectively. Also, impulsivity at delay 
D=0 is equal to kq irrespective of q. We have previously shown that the q-exponential 
discount function is capable of continuously quantifying human subjects' inconsistency 
in intertemporal choice [8,9]. Namely, human agents with smaller q values are more 
inconsitent in intertemporal choice. If q is less than 0, the intertemporal choice behavior 
is more inconsistent than hyperbolic discounting. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the present study 
The aim of this study was to examine impulsivity (kq in Equation 1) and inconsistency 
(Equation 2) in delay discounting of gain and loss among depressed patients, in 
comparison to healthy people. Based on previous research that has suggested higher 
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impulsivity among depressed patients, we propose the hypothesis that the depressed 
patients are more impulsive in intertemporal choice behavior than healthy normal 
subjects. It is important to note that our present study is the first to compare 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice between healthy controls and neuropsychiatric 
patients. Notably, previous findings regarding the relationship between serotonin and 
discounting have been mixed. A rodent animal model reported that a reduction in 
serotonergic activities were associated with exaggerated impulsivity in intertemporal 
choice over several seconds [18]; while a psychopharmacological study with human 
subjects did not observe a significant effect of a reduction in serotonergic activities on 
intertemporal choice over a year [19]. How our present study resolves the discrepancy 
between these studies is also discussed after presentation of our experimental data. 
Furthermore, we also aimed to examine the differences in impulsivity and 
inconsistency between discounting delayed gain and loss. The rationale is that no study 
to date examined the effect of the sign of delayed outcomes (i.e., gain or loss) on 
inconsistency in delay discounting, although it has been reported that delayed gain is 
more rapidly discounted than delayed loss (i.e., the sign effect in intertemporal choice 
[12]). 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 29 depressive patients diagnosed with DSM-IVTR (major depressive 
disorder and bipolar disorder, most recent episode: depressed) and 15 healthy control 
subjects. The depressive patient participants were patients of Hokkaido University 
Hospital, which serves a large urban catchments area. Participants’ ages ranged from 27 
to 67, with a mean age of 43.83 years (SD = 2.25), and healthy controls’ ages ranged 
from 31 to 71 with a mean age of 47.6 years (SD = 3.53). All participants including 
depressive patients and healthy control subjects filled an informed consent form before 
starting the experiment. The group of depressive patients consisted of both unipolar (i.e., 
patients with only a major depression phase) and bipolar (i.e., patients with both 
depressive and manic phases) disorders. It is important to note that bipolar disorder 
patients in a depressed state at the time of their participation (not in a manic state) were 
included in the present study, in order to exclude the influences of manic mental states 
on intertemporal choice. Consequently, there was no significant difference in 
intertemporal choice behavior between unipolar and bipolar disorder patients. Therefore, 
we combined both unipolar and bipolar patients (referred to as "depressive patients", 
hereafter). Moreover, most patients with depression were under medical treatment with 
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several types of antidepressants/mood stabilizers. We did not, however, find any 
significant effect of the types of antidepressants/mood stabilizers on intertemporal 
choice. Therefore, we did not divide the patients into sub-groups according to the types 
of antidepressants they intake. The characteristics of these subjects are described in 
more detail in Table 1. Subjects with past or current illegal drug use, assessed with 
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI, see below), were excluded from 
the present study, in order to avoid the influences of substance abuse on intertemporal 
choice. 
 
2.2 Intertemporal choice task 
 As a standard instrument measuring degrees to which participants discount delayed 
reward and loss, we conducted a face-to-face task developed by 
neuropsychopharmacologists Bickel and colleagues [20]. It is to be noted that we have 
also utilized this task in our previous studies [8,9,21].  
First, participants were seated individually in a quiet room, and faced the 
experimenter across a table. After that, participants received the simple instruction that 
monetary rewards (or losses) in this experiment were hypothetical, but the experimenter 
wanted them to think as though they were real money. Then the participants were asked 
to choose between the card describing money delivered immediately (or paid 
immediately, in the loss condition) and the card describing money delivered after certain 
delay (or paid after a certain delay, in the loss condition). The left card viewed by 
participants indicated the amounts of money that could be received immediately (or that 
had to be paid immediately, in the loss condition), and the right card indicated 100,000 
yen that could be received after a certain delay (or that had to be paid after a certain 
delay, in the loss condition. 
 For the delay discounting tasks, monetary rewards (or losses) and the delay time were 
printed on 3×5 index cards. The 27 monetary amounts were 100,000 yen (about 
$1,000), 99,000 yen, 96,000 yen, 92,000 yen, 85,000 yen, 80,000 yen, 75,000 yen, 
70,000 yen, 65,000 yen, 60,000 yen, 55,000 yen, 50,000 yen, 45,000 yen, 40,000 yen, 
35,000 yen, 30,000 yen, 25,000 yen, 20,000 yen, 15,000 yen, 10,000 yen, 8,000 yen, 
6,000 yen, 4,000 yen, 2,000 yen, 1,000 yen, 500 yen and 100 yen. The seven time 
delays were 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years and 25 years. 
 The experimenter turned the 27 cards sequentially. The card started with 100 yen, up to 
100,000 yen in the ascending order condition, or started with 100,000 yen, down to 100 
yen, in the descending order condition. For each card, participants chose either the 
immediate or the delayed reward (or loss). The experimenter wrote down the first 
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delayed reward chosen in the descending gain condition, first immediate reward chosen 
in the ascending gain condition, first immediate loss in the descending loss condition, 
and first delayed loss in the ascending loss condition. The average of these results (gain 
condition and loss condition were calculated separately), were used as the points or 
subjective equality (hereafter called the indifference point, a subjective value of delayed 
gain/loss) in the following analyses. This procedure was repeated for each of the seven 
delays (for more detail, see Bickel et al., 1999). The four conditions (ascending gain 
condition, descending gain condition, ascending loss condition, and descending loss 
condition) were conducted randomly for each participant. These conditions of the order 
of the delay discounting tasks did not significantly influence the results. Because our 
aim was to compare the group difference between healthy controls and depressive 
patients, we presented estimated parameters of the q-exponential discounting (see the 
next section) for group median data of the indifference point at each delay. It should 
also be noted that when the analysis was performed at the individual level, essentially 
the same conclusions were obtained. 
 After the determination of indifference points in the delay discounting tasks, 
we estimated parameters for the q-exponential discount function (i.e., kq and q in 
Equation 1, corresponding to impulsivity and inconsistency, respectively) for gain and 
loss, separately. For estimating the parameters, we conducted nonlinear curve fitting 
with the Gauss-Newton algorithm implemented in R statistical language (nonlinear 
modeling package). 
 
2.3 Questionnaires 
 
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) 
 To examine the participants’ drug abuse and alcohol abuse, we used MINI [22]. This 
scale is also a structured diagnostic scale, administered by well-trained psychiatric 
doctors when interviewing participants. Although this scale can divided into several 
parts for assessing specific psychiatric disorders, we used only 2 parts – those for 
assessing drug abuse and alcohol abuse. 
 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) 
 To assess both healthy and depressive participant’s degrees of depressive tendency, we 
assessed Beck’s Depression Inventory (more specifically, BDI-II) [23,24]. This scale is 
a commonly used self-report scale that measures severity of depression ‘over the past 
week’. The scale consists of 21 items that describe core depressive symptoms, with 
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score being rated on a 4-point scale. 
 In this study, we used the Japanese version of the BDI-II [25,26].  
 
Demographic questionnaire 
 In addition to the above measures, participants completed questionnaires about sex, 
age, history of smoking, and suicide attempt histories. These demographic data did not 
significantly affect intertemporal choice behavior in the present study. Therefore, we 
simply compared parameters in the q-exponential discount function for gain and loss 
between healthy controls and depressed patients. 
 
2.4 Data analysis 
 For statistically testing differences in estimated parameters in the q-exponential 
discount function at the individual level, we utilized t-tests. It is also to be noted that we 
examined the fitness of the discount models with AICc (Akaike Information Criterion 
with small sample correction) and observed that the q-exponential discount function 
best fitted among other models (i.e., exponential and hyperbolic functions) in both 
healthy controls and depressive patients. 
All statistical procedures were conducted with R statistical language 
(http://www.r-project.org/).  Significant level was set at 5% throughout. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Impulsivity and inconsistency in controls and depressive patients 
Demographic characteristics of depressive patients and healthy controls are presented in 
Table 1. We observed that BDI-II scores were higher for depressive patients than 
controls (p<0.05), verifying that our present populations were appropriate for the 
objectives of the present study. 
 The estimated parameters in the q-exponential discount function for gain and 
loss at the group level are summarized in Table 2 (Table 2-1 for gain, Table 2-2 for loss). 
Fitted q-exponential curves for group median indifference points were presented in Fig. 
1 (Fig. 1A for gain, Fig.2B for loss). We can see that depressive patients less 
dramatically discounted delayed outcomes in the distant future, compared to healthy 
controls, implying that depressive patients make more patient (less impulsive) 
intertemporal choice plans in the distant future. However, the patient plan does not 
imply that their actual intertemporal choice action is also patient (less impulsive), 
because it is possible for preference reversal to occur due to inconsistency in 
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intertemporal choice (see section 1.2). In order to investigate differences in both 
impulsivity at delay D=0, (i.e., impulsivity in intertemporal choice action) and 
inconsistency in delay discounting of gain and loss by controls and depressive patients 
at the individual level, we conducted t-tests on estimated kq (impulsivity at delay D=0) 
and q (time-consistency) between controls and depressive patients. Consequently, we 
found that depressive patients had significantly larger kq (impulsivity at delay D=0) and 
smaller q (time-consistency) for both gain and loss, in comparison to controls (ps<0.05). 
In other words, depressive patients were more impulsive and inconsistent in delay 
discounting actions for both gain and loss than healthy control subjects (see Table 2, for 
group data). Moreover, as noted earlier, there was no significant effect of demographic 
variables other than depressive status (e.g. sex, age, histories of suicide attempts, and 
the type of antidepressants) on the estimated parameters in the q-exponential discount 
function. 
 
3.2 Gain-loss asymmetries 
Next, we plotted the estimated q-exponential discount rate defined in Equation 4 (for 
gain and loss) of healthy controls and depressive patients (Fig. 2). As can be seen from 
Fig.2, depressive patients were more impulsive (i.e., a larger discount rate) in the near 
future, but less impulsive (i.e., a smaller discount rate) in the distant future, in 
comparison to healthy controls. This indicates that depressive patients may experience 
more exaggerated "preference reversal" in their intertemporal choice between plans and 
actions. It is important to note that depressive patients' discount rate for future loss at 
the delay of several decades is almost zero, indicating that depressive patients had 
hypersensitivity to potential bad outcomes in the extremely distant future (a red curve, 
Fig 2B). 
 In order to examine differences in impulsivity and inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice for gain and loss at the individual level, we conducted t-tests on 
estimated kq (impulsivity at delay D=0) and q (time-consistency) between gain and loss. 
We then observed that kq was significantly smaller for gain; while q was larger for gain 
(p<0.05), indicating that intertemporal choice for loss is less impulsive (in line with 
previous reports on the sign effect on a discount rate [12]) but more inconsistent (see 
Table 2 for group data). 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Impulsivity and inconsistency in depressive patients' intertemporal choice 
As far as we know, this study is the first to utilize the q-exponential discount model 
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inspired by Tsallis' non-extensive thermostatistics, in order to examine impairments in 
depressive patients' decision-making. We observed that depressive patients were more 
impulsive in intertemporal choice actions and more inconsistent in temporal discounting, 
in comparison to healthy subjects. Our results imply that (i) depressive patients may 
experience preference reversal more frequently and dramatically, than healthy subjects, 
(ii) depressive patients may be more sensitive to potentially harmful events occurring in 
the extremely distant future, than healthy subjects, and (iii) although depressive patients' 
plans about the distant future may be forward-looking, their intertemporal choice 
actions (occurring at delay D=0) may be more myopic than healthy controls. Future 
studies should examine whether subjects who tend to make infeasible future plans are 
more susceptible to depression. Another possibility is that neuronal changes associated 
with depression (e.g., hypoactivation of serotonergic systems) may induce 
time-inconsistency in temporal discounting. Concerning this possibility, several studies 
have indicated that time-inconsistency in temporal discounting may result from 
nonlinear distortion of psychological time [27-29].  
With respect to biophysical mechanisms underlying serotonergic modulation of 
time-perception in intertemporal choice, it should be noted that (i) biophysical 
simulation studies indicate that nonlinear psychophysical effects on sensation is 
mediated by electrical coupling between neurons [30] and (ii) serotonin modulates 
neuronal coupling [31]. Therefore, future neuroeconomic and biophysical studies should 
examine whether a decrease in serotoninergic activities induces both distorted 
time-perception and time-inconsistent discounting behavior. As noted in the 
introduction, findings on the relationship between serotonin and discounting have been 
mixed. Mobini and colleagues' study [18] demonstrated a reduction in serotonergic 
activities resulted in a significant increase in a discount rate; while Crean and 
colleagues' study [19] reported no significant effect. It should be noted that in Mobini 
and colleagues' study, the time-range of the intertemporal choice task was short; while 
Crean and colleagues' study employed longer delays, i.e., about 1 year (note that both 
Mobin et al.'s and Crean et al's studies did not employ the q-exponential discount 
function but a simple hyperbolic function [10-12], and therefore the estimated simple 
hyperbolic discount rates in Crean et al's study were under the influences of both 
relatively longer and shorter delays). Our present results of the relationship between 
depression (associated with a reduction in serotonergic activities) and temporal 
discounting may resolve the discrepancy: a decrease in serotonergic activities may 
increase a discount rate at short delays; while decrease a discount rate at longer delays 
(see Figure 2). This analysis is impossible without utilizing the q-exponential discount 
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function. 
A recent study reported that intertemporal choice for other is more inconsistent 
than for self [9]. It is important to examine whether intertemporal choice for other by 
healthy subjects involves similar neuropsychological processes to intertemporal choice 
for self by depressive patients. Neurochemically, a previous study implied that reduced 
(nor)adrenergic activities (assessed with salivary alpha-amylase levels) are associated 
with impulsivity in intertemporal choice [32]. It should therefore be examined whether 
(nor)adrenergic activities are likewise related to consistency in temporal discounting. 
 
4.2 Sign effects on intertemporal choice 
We observed that the signs of the outcomes (i.e., gain or loss) markedly affect both 
impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice (i.e., kq and q). Although several 
neuroeconomic studies examined the neural correlates of discounting delayed monetary 
gains [33], little is known regarding the neural processing underlying discounting of 
monetary loss. Future studies should examine which neuro-biophysical processes 
mediate the observed sign effects.  
 
4.3 Limitations and future directions 
As noted, the depressive patients in the present study were medicated with several types 
of antidepressants/mood stabilizers. Therefore, it is not completely evident that the 
treatments did not dramatically affect the intertemporal choice behavior. Nevertheless, 
our present results may not totally be attributable to the effects of antidepressants, 
because (i) we did not observe the effects of the types of antidepressants on the 
parameters in the q-exponential discount function, and (ii) BDI-II scores were 
significantly higher in the depressive patients than the controls, indicating that the 
patients were still depressed enough to elicit depression-induced alteration in 
intertemporal choice (we carefully scheduled our experiment so that the patients may 
participate during their depressive phase). In order to further resolve these issues, future 
studies should examine the effects of antidepressants on intertemporal choice by healthy 
human subjects (or animals). 
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Figure legends 
Fig. 1 Indifference points and fitted q-exponential discount function for gain (A) and 
loss (B). Black and red dots are indifference points at delays for healthy controls 
and depressive patients, respectively. Black and red curves are best-fit 
q-exponential discount functions for healthy controls and depressive patients, 
respectively. Note that in (B), the vertical axis is the unsigned (absolute) 
subjective value of delayed monetary loss. 
Fig. 2 Estimated q-exponential discount rate: kq/(1+kq(1-q)D) for gain (A) and loss (B). 
Black and red curves are q-exponential discount rates for healthy controls and 
depressive patients, respectively. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for demographic variables for depressed patients and healthy 
people 
 
  Depressive patients  Healthy controls 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Sex (% men)  55.18    40   
Age (years)  43.83  2.25  47.6  3.53 
BDI-II  20.52*  2.42  8.93  1.12 
*:Significantly larger than healthy controls (p<0.05). BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory (high 
BDI-II scores indicate severe depression). 
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Table 2-1. Group data of estimated parameters in q-exponential discounting for gain 
  Depressive patients  Healthy controls 
kq (impulsivity)   0.0006099  >  0.0004064  
q (consistency)   -2.4252055  <  -0.2132638  
Note that larger kq and q indicate more impulsive intertemporal choice at delay D=0 and 
more consistent intertemporal choice, respectively. 
 
Table 2-2. Group data of estimated parameters in q-exponential discounting for loss 
  Depressive patients  Healthy controls 
kq (impulsivity)   0.0005576  >  0.0002696  
q (consistency)   -72.5  <  -1.7333967  
Note that larger kq and q indicate more impulsive intertemporal choice at delay D=0 and 
more consistent intertemporal choice, respectively. 
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